


**Changes in Coalition Patterns of Ideological Political Parties to Transactional Pragmatists President Joko Widodo's Leadership Period 2014-2024**



**Perubahan Pola Koalisi Partai Politik Ideologis ke Pragmatis Transaksional Periode Kepemimpinan Presiden Joko Widodo 2014-2024**

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ARTICLE INFORMATION

<p><b>Keywords</b>  <i>Coalition Change;                  Political Parties;                  Joko Widodo's                  Government</i></p>	<p><b>ABSTRACT</b>  <i>This study discusses changes in the coalition pattern of political parties in the leadership period of President Joko Widodo who was elected in 2014 and 2019, this research uses a descriptive qualitative method with a literature/literature study approach, so the results show that in the first period the coalition pattern that was built was an ideological coalition pattern, but this pattern changed to transactional pragmatism, because the Coalition of political parties pro-president Joko Widodo's government experienced successive defeats in parliament, One of the defeats did not get a leadership seat in parliament because it lost the number of votes in parliament, so the ideological coalition pattern turned into a transactional pragmatic coalition, where President Joko Widodo attracted opposition parties, namely PPP, Golkar and PAN, to join the pro-government coalition, by sharing ministerial seats, with the aim that the government coalition could win in parliament in determining policies. In the second period of Joko Widodo's presidency, he became more pragmatic because Prabowo, who was Joko Widodo's rival, was drawn into a coalition with the government by giving Prabowo the position of Minister of Defense, so that the impact caused by democracy became unstable, because opposition parties were getting weaker and many policies in their determination were controversial, including the Job Creation Law, revision of the KPK Law, the IKN Law and the dissolution of organizations considered radical by the government.</i></p>
<p><b>Kata Kunci</b>  <i>Perubahan Koalisi;                  Partai Politik;                  Pemerintahan Joko                  Widodo;</i></p>	<p><b>ABSTRAK</b>                  Penelitian ini membahas tentang perubahan pola koalisi partai politik pada periode kepemimpinan Presiden Joko Widodo yang terpilih pada 2014 dan 2019, penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif deskriptif dengan pendekatan studi literatur/kepastakaan, maka didapati hasil bahwa pada periode pertama pola koalisi yang dibangun adalah pola koalisi ideologis, namun pola tersebut berubah menjadi pragmatis transaksional, karena Koalisi partai politik pro pemerintahan presiden Joko Widodo mengalami kekalahan beruntun di parlemen, salah satu kekalahannya tidak mendapatkan kursi pimpinan di parlemen karena kalah jumlah suara di parlemen, sehingga pola koalisi ideologis berubah menjadi koalisi pragmatis transaksional, dimana presiden Joko Widodo menarik partai oposisi yaitu PPP, Golkar dan PAN bergabung bergabung ke koalisi pro pemerintahan, dengan berbagi kursi kementerian, dengan tujuan koalisi pemerintah bisa menang di parlemen dalam penetapan kebijakan. Pada periode kedua pemerintahan presiden Joko Widodo semakin pragmatis karena Prabowo yang merupakan rival Joko Widodo ditarik untuk berkoalisi dengan pemerintahan dengan memberikan jabatan Menteri pertahanan kepada Prabowo, sehingga dampak yang ditimbulkan demokrasi</p>

	menjadi tidak stabil, karena partai oposisi semakin lemah dan banyak kebijakan dalam penetapannya menimbulkan kontroversial diantaranya UU Cipta Kerja, revisi UU KPK, UU IKN dan pembubaran organisasi yang dinilai radikal oleh pemerintah.
<b>Article History</b> Send 22 <sup>th</sup> Februari 2024 Review 18 <sup>th</sup> April 2024 Accepted 24 <sup>th</sup> December 2024	Copyright ©2024 <a href="#">Jurnal Aristo (Social, Politic, Humaniora)</a> This is an open access article under the <a href="#">CC-BY-NC-SA</a> license. Akses artikel terbuka dengan model <a href="#">CC-BY-NC-SA</a> sebagai lisensinya.



## Introduction

Indonesia is a country that adheres to a democratic system, where a country that adheres to this system realizes the sovereignty of the people over the state to be run by the government of the country or a system of government from the people by the people and for the people, and is organized directly or indirectly in choosing a government that functions to regulate the powers within a country. Currently, Indonesia adheres to a presidential system of government which is the separation of powers, namely the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary (Trias Politica) which has the principle of "checks and balances" which has been stated in the constitution (Aulia et al., 2021). In electing the holders of power in Indonesia, it is done in two ways, namely, for the Judiciary power is indirectly elected by the people and for the holders of executive and legislative power is directly elected by the people through General Elections with the principle of organizing directly, publicly, freely, secretly, honestly, and fairly, began to be applied in the reform era and the direct election system in electing executive and legislative officials represents the specific interests of citizens, such as religious values, justice, welfare, nationalism, anti-corruption, and the like brought by political parties. This is because the State of Indonesia remains consistent that the democratic system is used as a way to manage its state life and political parties are placed as an important tool in realizing state democracy. It cannot be denied that political parties are the pillars of a democratic system and without political parties, democracy cannot work and run, or it can also be said that the functioning and operation of a democratic state life is highly dependent on the existence of political parties in determining elected officials to regulate the constitutional authority in Indonesia (Daly & Jones, 2020).

In his political work, Joko Widodo before becoming president of the Republic of Indonesia (RI), his political career began in 2005 as Mayor of Solo, which was carried by two political parties, namely PDI-P and PKB with a percentage of votes of 36.62% and was re-elected as mayor of Solo in 2010 with a vote exceeding 90%. After two years in office, Joko Widodo was again nominated by PDI-P to run for Governor of DKI Jakarta and was also supported by the Greater Indonesia Movement (GERINDRA) party as his coalition (Sihidi et al., 2020). This is due to his populist leadership style in Solo, which succeeded in moving street vendors (PKL) from Taman Banjarsari to Pasar Klitikan without any conflicts or clashes between traders and the authorities, around 900 traders finally wanted to leave Taman Banjarsari in the center of Solo to a new location at Pasar Klitikan, With this success, Joko Widodo became a popular leader so that he was nominated as a candidate for Governor of DKI Jakarta in 2012. After the regional head election (Pilkada) Joko Widodo was successfully

elected and became Governor of DKI Jakarta, Jokowi made many changes and breakthroughs that were typical of his blouse style which made him increasingly popular throughout Indonesia, so that in 2014 Joko Widodo received a mandate from the Chairman of the PDI-P to run as a candidate for President of the Republic of Indonesia paired with Jusuf Kalla as a candidate for Vice President with the result of winning the Presidential and Vice Presidential elections in 2014 (Damayanti, 2022).

In the process of electing the President and Vice President in the first period in 2014, two coalitions of political parties were formed, namely between the coalition of parties supporting the Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla and Prabowo-Hatta candidate pairs. In the second period in 2019, two political party coalitions were also formed, supporting the Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin and Prabowo-Sandiaga Uno candidates (Nugroho & Pandiangan, 2019), with a comparison between the first period and the second period as follows:



(Figure 1: Political Party Support for the 2014 and 2019 Presidential Elections)  
Source: National Media DetikNews 2014 and Kompas 2018)

The presidential election in 2014 was followed by two pairs of candidates, namely Prabowo-Hatta, which was carried by six political parties including Gerindra: 73 seats (11.81% of the vote), PAN 49 seats (7.59% of the vote), PPP 39 seats (6.53% of the vote), PKS 40 seats (6.79% of the vote), PBB 0 seats (0% of the vote), Golkar 91 seats (14.75% of the vote), Democrats 61 seats (10.19% of the vote) with a total support of 353 seats in parliament or 57.66% of the vote. Meanwhile, the Jokowi-Kalla pair was carried by four political parties with a total support of 207 seats in parliament or 39.97% of the vote. After the presidential election process, the Jokowi-Kalla pair won with 70,997,851 votes (53.15%), while the Prabowo-Hatta pair received 62,576,444 votes (46.85%), with a difference of 8,421,389 votes. This marks

Jokowi-Kalla's victory in the political battle between Prabowo-Hatta and Jokowi-Kalla in 2014 (Wulandari & Tinov, 2017).

In 2019, the presidential election in Indonesia involved two pairs of candidates, namely Jokowi-Amin received additional support, namely the Golkar and PPP parties which used to support Joko Widodo's presidential opponent in 2014, so that Joko Widodo's support increased to 337 seats in parliament or around 61.25% of the vote, Meanwhile, the Prabowo-Sandiaga candidate pair was reduced to 223 seats in parliament or around 36.38% of the vote. Party support in the 2019 presidential election refers to the number of seats or votes obtained in the previous election in 2014, because the legislative and executive elections were carried out simultaneously in 2019 and were different and different from previous years which were carried out separately, why they were carried out simultaneously was based on the Constitutional Court (MK) Decision Number 14 / PUU-XI / 2013 that the implementation of the Presidential and Legislative elections was carried out simultaneously and applied to the 2019 general elections (elections) and again won President Joko Widodo with 85,607,362 votes (55.5%). Meanwhile, the Prabowo-Sandiaga pair only received 68,650,239 votes (44.5%). The significant vote difference reached 16,957,123 in favor of Joko Widodo and Ma'ruf Amin in the 2019 presidential election contestation (Afrah As Shaliha & M. Gazali Suyuti, 2021).

Of the two presidential election results, candidate Joko Widodo has always excelled and won consecutively in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections. Jokowi's victory was not determined by how much support the coalition of political parties had, but was more influenced by other factors. In both elections, a significant factor in Joko Widodo's victory was his populist figure, coupled with his blusukan campaign strategy that directly interacted with the community, especially the lower classes (Qorib & Waru, 2022). Joko Widodo succeeded in making himself a candidate who was attached to the hearts of the people, coupled with the volunteers he formed into a new color in Indonesian politics, where the volunteers were not only supporters of voting but also supervised up to the polling stations and even influenced in mobilizing the masses either in voting or becoming an attacker of Joko Widodo's opponent, Prabowo Subianto, who had a track record as a violator of human rights, Prabowo's elitist figure, which is far from the representation of a popular leader, makes Jokowi a presidential candidate who is more attached to the hearts of the people, so that these things become the determining factor for Joko Widodo's victory in the presidential election in the 2014-2019 period and in the 2019-2024 period (Yandra et al., 2023).

During his tenure, it has become controversial in President Joko Widodo's two terms of leadership to reshuffle his government cabinet quite often, which is indeed the president's

prerogative, but this decision is certainly also influenced by geopolitical causes and consequences that occur, For more details, please see the following table:

Table1: Cabinet Reshuffle of President Joko Widodo's Administration

No	Reshuffle (Jilid)	Schedule	Total Officials Replaced	Description
Period I				
1	I	12-08-2015	6	Acceleration of Cabinet Work
2	II	27-07-2016	14	The cabinet works faster, more effectively and with solid cooperation by also recruiting Golkar party cadre Airlangga and PAN party cadre Asman Abnur.
3	III	17-01-2018	2	Official resignations of Social Minister Khofifah and presidential chief of staff replaced to accelerate cabinet performance
4	IV	15-08-2018	1	Menpan RB official resigns because his party PAN refuses to support Jokowi in 2019 presidential election
Period II				
1	I	22-12-2020	6	Two ministerial officials were involved in corruption and four ministers were replaced to speed up cabinet performance
2	II	28-04-2021	2	The President created two new ministries and merged two ministries, the Ministry of Education and Culture with the Ministry of Research and Technology, and created the Ministry of Investment.
3	III	15-06-2022	2	Refreshing and Strengthening the Cabinet
	IV	03-04-2023	1	Previous minister resigns

(Source: Ministry of State Secretary 2023)

From the table above, it can be seen that during his tenure as President, Joko Widodo has reshuffled his cabinet eight times. Four of them were carried out in the working cabinet, and four times in the Indonesia Maju cabinet. Based on information from Joko Widodo, the reshuffle was carried out for various reasons. In the 2014-2019 period, some of the reasons for the reshuffle included accelerating cabinet performance, strengthening cooperation between ministries, and ministerial officials who resigned because they were involved in regional head elections. In the second period, the reasons for the reshuffle involved ministerial officials

involved in corruption cases, acceleration of cabinet performance, refreshment to strengthen the cabinet, and the resignation of ministerial officials, as happened in the Ministry of Youth and Sports who resigned because they were involved in the organization of a football association. In addition, President Joko Widodo also merged the Ministry of Education and Culture with the Ministry of Research and Technology, becoming Kemendikbudristek. Not only that, the formation of the Ministry of Investment is also one of the reasons for reshuffling in the second period, so the reshuffle and opposition parties to the government have made changes in the coalition pattern of political parties in the government of President Joko Widodo in his leadership period (Putri et al., 2022).

### **Method**

This research uses a qualitative method with a descriptive analysis approach from various sources such as related documents and conducting interviews with political party actors involved both from supporting parties and opposition parties and the views of various experts reinforced by literature studies sourced from journals or media (Yandra et al., 2022), this aims to be able to get deeper and more comprehensive information in dissecting the coalition patterns of political parties during the reign of President Joko Widodo which can survive in the face of various dynamics that disrupt the stability of the government he leads. After the results of the research are obtained, the researcher looks for whether the coalition pattern built by President Joko Widodo is related to various controversial policies during the reign of President Joko Widodo.

### **Result and Discussion**

Indonesia has adopted a multiparty system in the presidential system, and has used coalition practices in its government structure. Although a coalition in a presidential system with diverse parties turns out to provide its own difficulties and challenges, especially can be seen from the design of the applicable presidential election system, where the formation of a coalition becomes inevitable and must be done and the formation of this coalition should be seen as strengthening the framework of the presidential system of government currently adopted in the country of Indonesia. If the formation of a coalition is solely based on calculations to achieve the goal of victory in the general election, then the coalition is vulnerable to changes in the course of government. Therefore, to strengthen the presidential system of government, all political parties that wish to join the coalition should jointly determine the presidential and vice-presidential candidates to be promoted (Fina, 2021).

In accordance with Saldi Isra's view, the determination of presidential and vice-presidential candidates should be based on the results of legislative elections and/or the popularity of the candidates, which is then followed by the distribution of ministerial positions. This approach gives greater responsibility to the political parties supporting the coalition with regard to the continuity of the coalition government. However, the proposed concept may compromise some of the ideal principles of the presidential system of government, such as the loss of presidential prerogative in the appointment of cabinet members. Nonetheless, in the context of the current design, there continues to be a need for innovative thinking to overcome these challenges, which continues to be done from time to time (Isnaini, 2020).

After the amendment of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (UUD NRI Tahun 1945) affected the authority of the President, precisely the constitutional authority of a President became smaller and limited compared to the president before the reformation (Yandra et al., 2023), as happened in the administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), the first president to be directly elected by the people, and successfully completed his five-year term of office (2004-2009/2009-2014) which completed his tenure for a decade. The success of President SBY's leadership with smaller and limited constitutional authority was due to the coalition management model of President SBY's government with an all-party coalition government. The choice of large coalition management became a way out in managing his government with smaller and limited constitutional authority so that the SBY government experience was used as an example by President Joko Widodo. Where this choice certainly denies Jokowi's campaign promise which is determined to start a new political culture, namely the concept of coalition without transactional politics (Efriza, 2018).

#### **a. Coalition Patterns of Political Parties during the Jokowi Administration**

##### **First Period**

In the context of Indonesia, the tendency to form coalition patterns of political parties has a long history and is an integral part of the country's political dynamics. Indonesia, as a country with a multiparty system within the framework of a presidential system, has observed a diversity of political parties interacting with each other to form governing coalitions. Although presidential system coalitions with parties of different ideologies often present complexities and challenges, the design of the existing presidential election system cannot be separated from the reality of coalition government formation. Political party coalitions tend to form as a strategy to win elections, and this can be a starting point for cooperation between parties with



similar political visions (Rishan, 2020). However, pragmatic factors such as vote share and popularity of presidential candidates are key considerations in the coalition determination process. Although there is a tendency for coalitions to ensure the continuity of the government, this concept also has an impact on the ideal principles of the presidential system such as the independence of the president in filling cabinet positions based on the abilities and professionalism of the people who fill the positions of Ministers in the cabinet in the government in this context will look at the coalition patterns that occurred in the two leadership periods of President Joko Widodo (Hannan et al., 2021).

The beginning of President Joko Widodo's advancement as president began with the mandate of the General Chairperson of the PDI-P Megawati who issued a daily order letter whose contents supported Joko Widodo as the PDI-P presidential candidate, which was read by the Chairperson of the Election Winning Agency (BAPPILU), Puan Maharani at the PDI-P Central Leadership Council (DPP) Office in Jakarta on Friday, March 14, 2014. It is not without reason that PDIP nominated Joko Widodo, there are at least six considerations (Sudarmika & Bung Karno Jakarta, 2014), as follows:

- Joko Widodo's high popularity is based on a survey report published by the United Data Center (PDB), where at that time, Joko Widodo was still the Governor of DKI Jakarta and occupied the top position as a potential presidential candidate for the 2014 Presidential Election, with the highest support of 21.2 percent of respondents choosing Jokowi, followed by Prabowo with 17.1 percent. Megawati ranks third with 11.5 percent, followed by Rhoma Irama with 10.4 percent. Aburizal Bakrie reached 9.7 percent, while Jusuf Kalla occupied the seventh position with 7.1 percent. Other names such as Mahfud MD, Wiranto, and Dahlan Iskan also appeared in the survey with varying levels of support.
- Joko Widodo's unique character is also a great potential to become a presidential candidate, where Joko Widodo is considered to have a different character by having a distinctive character, so that with this it is then utilized through various media marketing strategies, besides that Jokowi is not easily affected by momentum and political issues that can harm him, thus making him a politician who was born with political instincts so that his strength is very difficult to be shaken by political efforts from other parties and deserves to be contested in the presidential election contest.
- This is based on the National Survey Media (Median) released on April 28 to May 6, 2014 which shows that the Governor of DKI Jakarta, Joko Widodo, still occupies the position of the most popular presidential candidate who reached 92 percent and Jokowi managed to outperform other popular names such as Jusuf Kalla who ranks second with 91.8 percent

popularity, and former President Megawati Soekarno Putri with a percentage of 91.3 percent. "Aburizal Bakrie is in third place with 82.6 percent, while Prabowo is in fourth place with 78.7 percent, who has been his rival for two consecutive terms. In addition, Jokowi's performance has also become a phenomenon in the eyes of the Indonesian people and should be recognized as a potential candidate to run as a presidential candidate in the 2014 presidential election. "Jokowi has managed to attract the attention of the majority of voters. In terms of popularity, Jokowi has been very strong among the public since he served as Governor of DKI Jakarta, especially with the support of extensive media coverage that often highlights Jokowi's performance.

- Center of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) researcher, Philip Jurius Vermonte, stated that the emergence of Jokowi's name at the top of the list is not solely due to the "Jokowi phenomenon", but rather because the Indonesian people want an alternative presidential candidate, such as the furniture businessman. Philip explained, "Basically (this result) is not about the 'Jokowi phenomenon' per se, but rather that the Indonesian people really expect an alternative leader candidate, namely Jokowi or another alternative candidate." This statement was made in Jakarta on Sunday. In addition, political observer and CSIS senior researcher J Kristiadi stated that Jokowi's emergence coincided with the momentum of the search for alternative presidential candidates. This happened despite the opinion that at that time Jokowi had only served as Governor of DKI Jakarta.

So for this reason PDIP firmly nominated President Jokowi as a candidate in 2014 and made a coalition agenda for political parties with the term Cooperation based on a political platform that reflects also on the ideological direction to be able to attract other parties to be able to coalition, but the criteria for cooperation are predicted to be difficult to do in practice so it is not implemented, only political talk and what is done is only to attract other parties to coalition and attract the public to vote for candidates to be promoted by political parties (Sandra Amalia, n.d.). By implementing a coalition agenda of political parties with the term cooperation or ideological coalition, Joko Widodo together with PDIP succeeded in building a coalition with other parties, namely Nasdem, Hanura, which is a nationalist party and PKB, which is a party that is identical to an Islamic or religious party, meaning that there are two streams that join the coalition that carries Joko Widodo as a presidential candidate candidate, namely from a party that adheres to the nationalist ideology of Pancasila with a party that adheres to Islamic ideology and from the ideological coalition that was built succeeded in delivering president Joko Widodo to win against his rival candidate, Prabowo Subianto, who received more party support, However, after Joko Widodo won the presidency, the ideological coalition party named

Koalis Indonesia Hebat (KIH) supporting Joko Widodo was unable to become the winner against the Red and White Coalition (KMP), which was previously a coalition of political parties from parties supporting candidates who lost against Joko Widodo, where the defeat was up to 6 times, such as: Determination of the MD3 Law, Determination of DPR Standing Orders, Election of DPR Leaders, Election of Commission Leaders and DPR Organs, Determination of Pilkada Law (via DPRD), and Election of MPR Leaders. Therefore, these conditions can disrupt the running of the government, where what becomes Joko Widodo's government program will always be faced with rejection, which in the end will be faced with voting and will end in the defeat of the KIH supporting the government (Rahayu, 2020).

Realizing that it is not easy to run politics in the government with only a little power in parliament, it is a consequence for the Joko Widodo government where the government's agenda will potentially also experience rejection from opposition parties in the parliament, so with these conditions Jokowi finally began to ignore the unconditional coalition that was heralded in the run-up to the 2014 presidential election, where this was evidenced by the use of internal conflicts in the management of PPP over differences in support maneuvers in the 2014 presidential election. The KIH, which had been maneuvering to build new power in parliament by expanding its coalition support with the joining of Romahurmuziy's version of PPP, responded by providing seats from the MPR leadership candidate package, and was even given the trust to occupy the seat of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Although the KIH version of the MPR leadership package lost, compensation in the form of a religious ministry seat was still given to PPP. As a result, the government continued to consolidate politics to gain a majority in parliament by embracing opposition parties such as PAN and Golkar with the consequence that Joko Widodo had to share portions of the government, especially in ministerial seats, so that this became one of the main triggers for the reshuffle of the Joko Widodo government cabinet in his government period and the offer to join the government coalition was not only to the three parties that had joined and even offered to other parties such as PKS, but this party remained consistent with Democrat and Gerindra to remain in opposition to the Joko Widodo government, although in the end the KMP dissolved due to the joining of three parties that were initially ready to oppose the government (Siboy, 2021).

Seeing these conditions, that the inconsistency of the coalition pattern of political parties both from the government camp and the opposition parties has changed from a political ideological coalition without transactional to a pragmatic coalition of sharing positions in ministerial seats and according to predictions the ideological coalition is very difficult to realize, because it needs to be realized that since the amendment of our constitution the 1945

Constitution which affects the authority of the president has become small and limited, when compared to before and the amendment was intended to balance the executive and legislative powers (checks and balances), but instead what happened was to obscure the presidential system that was built, where we also adhere to a multi-party system, so that it will give birth to more party groups that occur today in Indonesia (Kunkunrat & Priangani, 2019). Where the safest way to secure the running of the government is to build a coalition of fat parties is the safest path for the government to take, if the Jokowi Government does not do this, the consequences that occur are that it will be difficult for proposals (government programs) to be approved by the DPR and it will be a natural defeat because it does not get the majority of supporters and will still lose if it does not increase the number of supporters in parliament which will lead to voting in determining government decisions (Suryani & Rahayu, 2021).

#### **b. Second Period**

In 2019, the first general election in Indonesia to be held simultaneously took place, where in addition to determining the President and Vice President, this election also determines members of the DPR, DPD, and Provincial / Regency / City DPRD simultaneously and casts five pieces of ballots into the voting booth, because it was held for the first time The 2019 election can be considered as an election process that is not easy for voters because they need to spend longer in the voting booth to elect five representatives of the people simultaneously, where in previous elections the presidential and vice presidential elections were elected separately (Solihah, 2018).

The proposed simultaneous elections aim to reduce the state budget for holding elections, reduce high political costs for election participants, and avoid the practice of money politics involving voters, abuse of power, or politicization of the bureaucracy. In addition, the goal also includes simplifying the government's work scheme. Simultaneous elections are considered to have an impact on the commitment of strengthening political parties in permanent coalitions to strengthen their positions in high state institutions. Simultaneous elections are expected to facilitate the improvement of the presidential system in Indonesia, as explained in Constitutional Court Decision No. 14/PUU-XI/2013, which examined Law No. 42/2008 on General Elections for President and Vice President. Although this decision was issued in the end, its implementation can only be done in the 2019 General Election due to the timing when the decision was announced. The 2019 General Election was a costly event, as it resulted in many casualties. Based on the results of the Ministry of Health's investigation in 28 provinces until May 15, 2019, there were 11,239 Voting Organizing Group (KPPS) officers who fell ill

and 527 officers who died during the 2019 Election duties (Kompas.com, 29/07/2019). West Java Province recorded the highest number of election officers who died (Benuf, 2019).

The investigation revealed that many of the casualties were caused by the officers' medical history and triggered by the heavy and complex workload during their duties as election organizers. Therefore, this study will explore and evaluate the simultaneous election system, especially in the context of the workload of election organizers, especially KPPS officers. This is necessary considering the significant number of casualties that occurred during the 2019 simultaneous elections. The Presidential Election in 2019 again brought together candidates Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto as challengers after the election Presidential Candidate Joko Widodo came out as the winner, with no change or still two pairs of candidates fighting has led to very tough competition between candidates and based on the results of the quick count, several independent survey institutions stated that candidate pair number 01 was superior by almost 10 percent of the total votes obtained by candidate pair number 02. When we analyze the distribution of votes among the contestants in the presidential election (pilpres) this time, it seems that the phenomenon of "Strong Voters" can be seen clearly. Political experts define the phenomenon of "Strong Voters" as a situation where the people of an area have formed a fixed political preference and are difficult to change by any factor, meaning that in areas experiencing the phenomenon of "Strong Voters," people tend to have established political choices, and are difficult to influence or change by other political events or arguments. This indicates stability in political support in the area, which can be an important factor in understanding local political dynamics during presidential elections (Budiana, 2020).

In the 2014 elections, Prabowo dominated in Aceh, West Sumatra, West Java, Banten and West Nusa Tenggara. This was repeated in the most recent election. Although the incumbent tried hard to gain support in Prabowo's vote base, such as the open support from Governor Ridwan Kamil, Dedi Mizwar, Dedi Mulyadi, and other influential figures in West Java, the efforts did not yield the expected results. A similar phenomenon occurred in West Sumatra, where 10 regional heads declared support for candidate 01, but Jokowi suffered a bigger defeat than the previous election (Aminuddin, 2019). Banten and West Nusa Tenggara were also unsuccessful, where open support from prominent clerics could not change people's political preferences. Although KH Maruf Amin in Banten and Tuan Guru Bajang (TGB) in NTB have significant religious influence, the LSI survey shows that people's political choices tend not to be influenced by clerics' political support. This phenomenon of "Strong Voters" also happened to pair 02, which despite establishing victory posts in Central Java and East

Java, still suffered a crushing defeat in both regions, even worse than the 2014 election (Sonny, 2019).

From this phenomenon, we can conclude that infrastructure development and political support from regional heads do not automatically change people's political preferences. The positive side is that people are getting smarter and more independent in determining their political choices, not depending on the political direction of certain elite figures. However, this phenomenon also has a negative side, namely the polarization that we felt very massively before the presidential election, even this polarization has not been able to disappear completely after the presidential election took place. If we look back at pair number 01 significantly superior in non-Muslim voter base areas such as Bali, East Nusa Tenggara, Papua, North Sulawesi, West Sulawesi, West Papua, and West Kalimantan, this creates an unfavorable precedent for our unity. The impact of this emerging polarization is evident, where religious beliefs make room for stark differences between candidates 01 and 02. Minority voters tend to feel more comfortable and secure with the leadership of candidate 01, as the Muslim group represented by candidate 01 is perceived as a protector of those who are considered minorities (Ardipandanto, 2020).

Although the elections have ended, all forms of polarization and disparity that we have experienced should also end. All parties, ranging from political elites, community leaders, religious leaders, students, and the general public, must begin to realize that the interests of the country and nationality must be placed above all other interests. However, the results of this election will be announced by the institution appointed by the constitution to carry them out, and if there is dissatisfaction with the results, claims of fraud, and the like, it should be resolved through legitimate constitutional channels. As a party that felt cheated, candidate Prabowo Subianto, who also felt cheated, filed a lawsuit to the Constitutional Court (MK), but the Constitutional Court rejected all requests for Disputes over the Results of the 2019 Presidential and Vice Presidential General Elections (PHPU President 2019) submitted by Presidential and Vice Presidential Candidate Number 02, Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Salahuddin Uno (Prabowo-Sandi) in the Constitutional Court Decision Number 01/PHPU-PRES/XVII/2019 (Atmadja, 2021), as follows:

- The Constitutional Court did not find convincing evidence regarding the truth of the occurrence of the events postulated by the applicant regarding the non-neutrality of the state apparatus," said Constitutional Judge Aswanto.
- Regarding the alleged systematic and massive (TSM) violations in the form of restrictions on press freedom, especially on the Indonesia Lawyers Club (ILC) broadcast, the applicant

was considered unable to confirm the direct relationship between the broadcast and the results of the presidential election. Aswanto stated, "The petition argument is considered to have no legal basis because it cannot prove a clear causal relationship, namely the vote acquisition of 01 and 02."

- Regarding the alleged TSM fraud, one of the evidence submitted by the applicant is the testimony of Hairul Anas. He stated that the Deputy Chairman of the Jokowi-Ma'ruf National Campaign Team (TKN), Moeldoko, publicly said that fraud was part of democracy in a witness training or training of trainers (tot) at the El Royale Hotel Jakarta in February. However, the Constitutional Court (MK) emphasized that handling TSM fraud is the authority of the Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu). Constitutional Judge Manahan stated, "The Court will only examine if the institution responsible for handling TSM does not carry out its duties and has an impact on the vote results of the presidential and vice presidential candidate pairs."
- Regarding the vote acquisition claim, the Prabowo camp stated that the 02 won 68,650,239 votes, or around 52 percent, while the Jokowi-Ma'ruf pair only received 63,573,169 votes, or around 48 percent. However, this claim differs from the results of the General Election Commission (KPU) recapitulation on May 21, 2019, which showed that the Jokowi-Ma'ruf pair actually obtained 85,607,362 votes, or around 55.5 percent. Meanwhile, Prabowo-Sandi claimed to get 68,650,239 votes. The panel of judges noted that the Prabowo-Sandi camp did not include evidence of recapitulation from each province. The documents submitted by the 02 camp were only photos and scans that could not be ascertained from the source. "Constitutional Judge Arief Hidayat stated that the Court is of the opinion that the arguments submitted by the applicant are considered unreasonable according to law."
- Regarding accusations related to 22 million stealth Permanent Voter Lists (DPT), the camp 02 claims the number is based on the addition of 5.7 million Special Voter Lists (DPK). The 02 camp also asked the General Election Commission (KPU) to open the voter attendance list (C7) so that everything could be explained. However, Constitutional Judge Saldi Isra stated that the KPU had made improvements to the voter list. In addition, the 02 camp could not present evidence that the people included in the 22 million additional DPT actually exercised their voting rights to their detriment. In his words, Constitutional Judge Saldi Isra stated, "This means that the applicant cannot prove whether the people included in the 22 million additional DPT actually used their voting rights or not. Thus, the issue of DPT is no longer relevant."

- The issue of alleged election violations through the KPU's Vote Counting Information System (Situng) is a concern. The Prabowo-Sandi legal team claimed that there were many chaos in the Situng data input that harmed them. One example occurred at polling station 17, Lembur Situ Village, Situ Mekar District, Sukabumi City, West Java. At the polling station, candidate pair 01 was claimed to have received 42 votes, while candidate pair 02 received 161 votes. However, the Situng recorded that candidate pair 01 received 161 votes and candidate pair 02 only 42 votes. Despite a number of errors in data input, the Constitutional Court (MK) judges rejected the petition. This is because Situng is considered different from the tiered vote recapitulation at the General Elections Commission (KPU), which determines the election results. Judge Suhartoyo at the Constitutional Court building explained that Situng is not the final data because it still allows for corrections in stages.
- Issues related to Jokowi-Ma'ruf's campaign funds are in the spotlight. The camp 02 questioned the receipt of campaign donations from candidate pair 01 totaling Rp19,508,272,030. They highlighted that on April 12, 2019, Jokowi's wealth recorded in the State Organizer Asset Report (LHKPN) was only around Rp6 billion. However, the Constitutional Court (MK) considered that the issue related to this campaign fund had followed the appropriate procedures. The Court's reasoning was that the campaign funds had been reported to the General Elections Commission (KPU) and had been audited by a public accounting firm. Furthermore, the Court noted that the 02 camp had never reported this issue to the Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu). The Constitutional Court stated that they could only process campaign finance issues if Bawaslu had previously handled them. Arief Hidayat, in a hearing at the Constitutional Court Building, said that the campaign funds of the presidential and vice presidential candidate pair 01 were in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations.
- The issue of Ma'ruf Amin's position on the Supervisory Board of BNI Syariah and Bank Mandiri Syariah has become contentious in the context of the election. Prabowo-Sandi's legal team considers it an election violation and urges Ma'ruf's disqualification. They argued that candidates who hold positions in State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) must resign from their positions as mandated by the Election Law. However, the Constitutional Court (MK) considered that BNI Syariah and Mandiri Syariah are not categorized as SOEs. The reason is based on the Law on State-Owned Enterprises, which states that SOEs are business entities whose capital is partly or wholly derived from state assets. The Court clarified that the capital composition of the two banks showed that BNI Syariah was owned



by BNI Life Insurance, while Mandiri Syariah came from Mandiri Sekuritas. Thus, MK Judge Wahidudin Adams stated that the petition to disqualify Ma'ruf Amin has no legal basis. The Court took the standard that the two banks are not state-owned enterprises, so no resignation from positions in them is required.

Jokowi's victory in 2019 after the rejection of the Prabowo Subianto candidate's lawsuit was certainly influenced by the large capital that Jokowi already had in the government and the coalition that Jokowi pulled from the KMP opposition through transactional politics in the first year which he continued to consolidate remained persistent and solid except for the PAN party which had already had seats in the ministry leaving the Jokowi camp and joining to support candidate Prabowo Subianto for three reasons, namely, related to the slow resolution of the case against the senior investigator of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) Novel Baswedan, Our party PAN has one thing in common with coalition party partners so that there is an understanding to support Prabowo-Sandiaga and de facto PAN has been together for a long time and has the same ideals, the struggle for fair law enforcement and returning sovereignty to the Indonesian people in accordance with the ideals of an independent Indonesia, in line with this, the Jokowi camp is solidly building its coalition by gaining additional support from parties that were once in the opposition and turned to support Jokowi in the 2019 elections (Ekawati, 2019).

#### **b. Changes in the Coalition Pattern of Political Parties are to Smooth Policies in the Joko Widodo Government Period**

##### **First Period Policy**

After being determined to win the presidential election in 2014, the President immediately formed a government cabinet and was inaugurated on October 20, 2014 and the formation of the cabinet was carried out without any compromise between all parties, because the coalition of President Joko Widodo's camp built a rapping coalition without transactional politics and compromise, meaning that before President Joko Widodo was inaugurated. Parliament was divided into two camps and competed with each other between the camp supporting the government, all of whose parties came from Joko Widodo's supporting parties, namely PDIP, Nasdem, Hanura and PKB, known as KIB, and the KMP, which was a coalition supporting the losing candidate in the 2014 presidential election, Prabowo Subianto, consisting of the Democratic Party, PPP, Golkar, PAN, Gerindra and PKS. However, the policy proposals of Joko Widodo's government were not smooth and accepted to be established in the government, this was due to the strength of the opposition, so that government policies became

polemic and controversial throughout 2015 or a year Joko Widodo became president (Adi Syaputra, 2020), including the following:

- **Change of Chief of Police in 2015**

President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo's decision caused a polemic, because on January 8, Jokowi sent a letter to the DPR, announcing that Commissioner General Budi Gunawan was the only candidate for the position of Chief of the Indonesian National Police, replacing General Sutarman. A strong response came from the public, especially from anti-corruption activists, as Budi's name was linked to the fat account case and was already a suspect by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). For 40 days, there was a political and legal tumult that became a difficult period for corruption eradication efforts, triggered by Jokowi's decision. On February 18, Jokowi held a press conference at Bogor Palace. He proposed Badrodin Haiti as the new candidate for the post of Chief of Police. Budi, who was later cleared of suspect status by the State Administrative Court, was promised the position of Deputy Chief of Police (Dewi, 2017).

- **Cabinet Reshuffle the cabinet**

In less than a year of leading the country, Jokowi has reshuffled his cabinet. Since the initial announcement of the cabinet line-up, criticism has arisen mainly related to the size of the cabinet, which is considered large, in contrast to the promises he made during the campaign. Although the numbers are not significantly different from the previous cabinet in SBY's era, there is a strong involvement of supporting political parties. This contradicts Jokowi's campaign promise to form a professional cabinet. Major problems arose when there was an economic slowdown, partly due to global conditions and partly due to a decline in public confidence in Jokowi's administration. On August 12, 2015, Jokowi announced a cabinet line-up that underwent significant changes. One of the changes included the replacement of Rachmat Gobel as Minister of Trade by Tom Lembong, as well as Sofyan Djalil as Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs who was replaced by Darmin Nasution who was previously Governor of Bank Indonesia. Sofyan Djalil was then moved to become the State Minister of Bappenas, at the expense of Andrianof Chaniago, who had previously supported Jokowi's success team since the DKI Jakarta election era. Jokowi also brought in Rizal Ramli as Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs. However, after his appointment, Rizal Ramli created controversy by openly criticizing fellow cabinet members, including Minister of State-Owned Enterprises Rini Soemarno and Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Sudirman Said. He even criticized Vice President Jusuf Kalla over the 35,000 mega watt electricity

project. Luhut Pandjaitan, the President's Chief of Staff, stated that the cabinet reshuffle was done in response to the global economic downturn (Hasanah et al., 2016).

- **Weakening KPK and revision of KPK Law**

Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs Luhut Panjaitan proposed four points of change to the Corruption Eradication Commission Law (KPK Law). First, Luhut discussed the Notification of Investigation Letter (SP3), which relates to human rights issues. He argued that cases involving someone who has died should not be continued. He cited the practice of the KPK in Hong Kong as an example. Second, Luhut voiced the need for a watchdog for the KPK. He argued that every organization should have a watchdog, which would be established by the government. The supervisor is expected to consist of experienced individuals who have completed their term of office. The third point proposed by Luhut relates to wiretapping (Zain, 2022). He stated that regulations related to wiretapping will be set, and KPK will be required to show that they have implemented the correct procedures. The decision to continue wiretapping will depend on an evaluation by the watchdog. Fourth, Luhut discussed the need for independent investigators. While recognizing the potential for debate around this, he argued that with a watchdog in place, independent investigators could be verified without issue. Meanwhile, the polemics over the revision of the KPK Law also include the question of who initiated the revision. Investigations have shown that the initiative came from the government, as reflected in the draft bill, which still bears the President's logo. PDI-P lawmaker Masinton Passaribu pointed out that the draft bill has been part of the 2015 Priority National Legislation Program in the House of Representatives since June 2015, and at the time it was a proposal from the government. Anti-corruption activists consider the revision of the KPK Law as an attempt to weaken the institution. They identified 15 controversial points in the draft KPK bill (Sapahuma, 2015).

- **Fast Trains From China**

Jokowi has allowed this controversy to rage on for quite some time, directing criticism mainly at his minister, Rini Soemarno. Not only has Rini been criticized by PDI-P lawmakers for favoring Chinese investors over Japanese, but she has also been criticized by fellow cabinet members such as Rizal Ramli. Ironically, from the outset, Jokowi himself had a preference for partnering with China in the prestigious project of building a superfast railway from Jakarta to Bandung. This decision was based not only on economic but also political considerations. China promised in early 2019 that the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway would be ready to operate. It was an election year, and this was considered a political advantage for Jokowi (Yamin & Windymadaksa, 2017).

With the many polemics and controversies that occurred during Jokowi's one year in office, he reshuffled the cabinet volume II by recruiting the iGolkar party cadre Airlangga as Minister of Industry and Trade and the PAN party cadre Asman Abnur to become Menpan RB, coupled with PPP cadres who had joined previously to get the Minister of Religion, namely Lukman Hakim, so that this adds to Jokowi's strength in the Government where one of the most prominent policies is the Revision of the KPK Law on December 21, 2019 which was proposed by the government already in 2015 exactly one year into the presidency of Joko Widodo which received strong rejection from activists and students.

### **Second Period Policy**

In the second period, President Joko Widodo became more pragmatic and was not satisfied with the fat coalition he had built in the first period, in his second period President Joko Widodo attracted Prabowo Subianto to serve in Joko Widodo's cabinet ministry, where Prabowo was his rival in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections through hard and fierce battles, resulting in polarization in the community supporting the pro Jokowi camp and the pro Prabowo camp whose effects lasted a very long time, where the addition of this coalition is of course also related to Jokowi's need to support what his programs and policies can run smoothly in the second period with the withdrawal of Prabowo, who is also the general chairman of the Gerindra party, where with the magnitude of the political power of President Joko Widodo from the pragmatic coalition pattern he built, smoothing Joko Widodo in setting his policies (Citra Widayanti & Yulita Nilam Fridiyanti, 2024), the following are as follows:

#### **- Enactment of the Job Creation Law**

In 2020, exactly a year after President Joko Widodo took office, something that became controversial and there was rejection everywhere by students regarding the Job Creation Law, the ratification of the Law was carried out, because the majority of parties agreed, namely PAN, PDIP, Nasdem, PKB, PPP, Hanura and including the Gerindra party which previously tended to be in opposition to government policies, where Gerindra's joining the coalition of parties supporting the government was part of the government's steps to pass what was the policy of the government and its coalition, despite getting resistance efforts from the public (Muqsith, 2020).

#### **- Relocation of the National Capital**

Joko Widodo's government made a policy of relocating the national capital which was also a controversial policy carried out during Jokowi's second term, but from Jokowi's steps which have strengthened his government with many major parties joining the government

coalition, this has made it easier for Jokowi's policy to be ratified in the form of the IKN Law which has been passed today where in the ratification of this Law the majority of parties agree except for one party, namely the PKS party (Arsi & Waluyo, 2021).

- **Dissolution of Organizations Declared as Prohibited Organizations**

The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) is a community organization (Ormas) that has been established in the post-reform era, precisely on August 17, 1998, which was founded by a number of scholars, preachers, Muslim activists and Muslims. In its peak gait, this organization was able to carry out massive action which culminated on December 2, 2016, known as the 212 Islamic Defense Action in the case of blasphemy committed by the governor of DKI Jakarta, namely Basuki Tjahya Purnama alias Ahok at Monas in volumes and urged that Ahok be criminalized for blasphemy that Ahok did and the activities carried out by FPI succeeded in the legal process and previously Ahok was defeated in the DKI Jakarta Regional Head Election (Zulfadli & Taufani, 2022).

In the second period of Joko Widodo's administration, exactly one year Gerindra party joined the governing coalition, so that the opposition party was greatly weakened in the government and the FPI mass organization was disbanded through a Joint Decree (SKB) of three ministries, namely the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Minister of Law and Human Rights, and the Minister of Communication and Information which stated December 30 that the FPI was considered dissolved and the prohibition of activities using symbols and attributes and the termination of FPI activities, quoting the confession of "former Minister of Religion Fachrul Razi" in the EdShareOn podcast with Edy Wijaya on December 4, 2023 in the podcast asking why he was removed from the position of Minister of Religion and Mr. fahrurrazi said why he was removed it was very possible with my very striking differences of opinion with the president and vice president on the issue of FPI and honestly he also said that he had never mingled with FPI and met with the chairman of FPI only once at his son's wedding and even then met among hundreds of other invitations, related to the dissolution of FPI, I was summoned twice by the president and the vice president once, but I always behave and convey that FPI does not need to be dissolved and it is enough to be fostered because it is not a threat in my opinion and then before a week before I was reshuffled there was a cabinet meeting with the topic of dissolution of FPI and I attended before that I asked my wife for her opinion with the conclusion that the best option is not to dissolve FPI, it is enough to be fostered and so during the meeting all ministries and institutions that attended the meeting all said dissolve it except me who did not need to be dissolved, it was better to be fostered and finally waited for

the president's decision and a week later I was reshuffled and three days later FPI was dissolved again (Ismail et al., 2021).

The dissolution of organizations that are considered forbidden has also previously been carried out, namely in the organization of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) in 2017 after the joining of three opposition parties in 2016 by the Ministry of Law and Human Rights and during the trial of a lawsuit filed by HTI in testing the Law on Community Organizations to the Constitutional Court, and at that time the former secretary general of the HTI Central Leadership Council claimed that the government had never given a warning by the government that HTI was against Pancasila and even HTI attempted to hold hearings with the government, but the government did not respond (Muazaroh, 2019).

Quoting the view of Andalas University constitutional law expert Feri Amsari on CNN Indonesia on December 31, 2023, he said that the dissolution of FPI was legal because it had been promulgated, but according to him the government seemed authoritarian and there should be process spaces for an institution or mass organization to defend itself before being dissolved, The dissolution of FPI is the impact of government regulations in lieu of Law (Perppu) Number 2 of 2017 which has been enacted into law number 16 of 2017 in the law for the dissolution of mass organizations no longer need to go through legal mechanisms in court in the sense that the dissolution of mass organizations can be carried out by the government through decisions or policies without a court decision, Feri Amsari further said that at that time the first mass organization that was dissolved was HTI and the regulation was different from the previous mass organization law, namely Law Number 17 of 2013 which still required a court decision in the dissolution of the mass organization in article 71 stated, the application for dissolution of the mass organization was decided by the district court within 60 days, but Perppu Number 2 of 2017 has removed a number of these mechanisms, mass organizations cannot defend themselves in court and if because of the government's will to dissolve, then all mass organizations or institutions that differ from the government's views can be dissolved, so that makes the government seem authoritarian (Rabbina & Irfani, 2022).

So it is realized that behind the change in the pragmatic coalition pattern built by the Joko Widodo government tends to be related to government policies that emerged more or less a year later, namely 2016 the joining of Golkar, PAN and PPP in the HTI government coalition which was dissolved in 2017 in the first period and in the second period with the joining of Gerindra to the 2019 government coalition in 2020 the FPI organization was dissolved, where these two organizations were prominent in carrying out actions to defend Islam, which culminated in the 212 Islamic defense action, the number of participants quoting the

REPBLUBIKA media. CO.ID December 4, 2016 estimated at 7.5 million people who filled Monas and the roads around it (DS & Sutiadi, 2020).

## Conclusion

Coalitions are a common occurrence in government that aim to strengthen the president's position in maintaining government stability. President Joko Widodo was a candidate nominated by the PDIP party to run in the presidential election in 2014 with additional party support from Nasdem, PKB and Hanura and managed to win the election against candidate Prabowo Subianto twice in a row. The comparison of coalition patterns in the first period with the second period is that in the first period President Joko Widodo formed his coalition with an ideological approach, but changed to a pragmatic one because the coalition that won Joko Widodo experienced successive defeats, one of which was that Joko Widodo's supporting parties did not get leadership seats in parliament, so that one year of President Joko Widodo's leadership was busy consolidating and in the second period Jokowi had used a pragmatic political coalition pattern or transactional ministerial positions to coalition parties and even Prabowo as the opponent of President Joko Widodo in the presidential contest in the second period offered Jokowi to become a Minister, so that the joining of opposition parties was to make it easier for Joko Widodo and his coalition parties to smooth out the policies he made.

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